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Introduction
Attitudinal Hedonism is a theory of well-being which claims that welfare
consists in states of attitudinal pleasure.1 Fred Feldman characterizes attitudinal
pleasure as a state of consciousness similar to attitudes of hope and fear or belief
and doubt.2 He employs the term, enjoyment for the relevant conscious state of
attitudinal pleasure and disenjoyment for attitudinal pain.3 Attitudinal pleasures
and pains contrast with sensory pleasures like sex or drugs and sensory pains
like cuts or bruises which are felt with the senses in the same way that
temperature is felt. So someone who enjoys sitting at home alone to quietly read
a book experiences not sensory pleasure, but attitudinal pleasure. This makes
Attitudinal Hedonism a much more plausible theory of well-being than Sensory
Hedonism which would maintain that activities like quietly reading cannot
increase one’s welfare even if one enjoys these activities.
But Attitudinal Hedonism has a different flaw according to Peter de
Marneffe who claims the view leads to the implausible conclusion that the
concept of welfare does not apply to beings which are not capable of enjoyment
or disenjoyment.4 In this paper I’ll defend Attitudinal Hedonism against de
Marneffe’s objection. I’ll begin by examining de Marneffe’s objection more
closely and identifying two distinct responses to it. First, I’ll argue that it is not a
1 Feldman (2002), 604-628.
2 Ibid, 605-609.
3 Ibid, 607.
4 de Marneffe (2003), 198.
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problem for Attitudinal Hedonism if the concept of welfare does not apply to the
types of beings de Marneffe imagines. Second, I’ll propose a broader definition

(P2): Spock can be well off or badly off.
(C): So, AH is false.
Feldman is unlikely to be moved by de Marneffe’s objection. In her

of attitudinal pleasure which allows us to apply the concept to de Marneffe’s

review of Feldman’s book, Serena Olsaretti rejects the Spock objection as

hypothetical beings. For this purpose I’ll argue that attitudinal pleasure is the

relying on too narrow a view of attitudinal pleasure.8 In fact Feldman later

subjective satisfaction of desire.

expanded his paper into a book which includes a larger list of pro-attitudes that
de Marneffe’s Objection: Spock’s Horn

count as attitudinal pleasure by his lights. To enjoyment he adds being pleased,

de Marneffe imagines a being called Spock, loosely based on Spock from
Star Trek, but different in some important ways. This Spock is capable of some
propositional attitudes but not others. Among them he is capable of approval,

glad or delighted as well as contentment or satisfaction with one’s life.9 Despite
Spock’s lack of capacity for certain pro-attitudes, it seems that he is still capable
of contentment and satisfaction with his own life. Olsaretti sees this as enough to

disapproval and belief but not anger, fear or enjoyment.5 In the absence of such
attitudes, what motivates Spock are his normative judgements. He envisions

escape de Marneffe’s objection but she also argues that Feldman’s book fails to
give a adequate account of what exactly counts as attitudinal pleasure.10

himself as a successful officer of the Starship Enterprise, and eventually realizes
this goal. He is a good officer who keeps his crew safe and demonstrates

This leaves us with two ways of responding to de Marneffe. We could
take a broad view of attitudinal pleasure and reject premise P1 of Spock’s Horn

excellent propensity for rationality and reasoning. de Marneffe claims that if

and assert that according to AH there is such a thing as welfare for Spock. But

Attitudinal Hedonism is true, nothing is prudentially good or bad for Spock due
to his lack of capacity for (dis)enjoyment. There is nothing that constitutes wellbeing, or ill-being, for Spock; he would be equally well off dead or alive. This

this would require a proper definition of what attitudinal pleasure actually is.
Feldman’s description is vague and incohesive, it isn’t clear what unifies the
attitudes he lists. Alternatively, we could reject P2 and assert that though the

seems intuitively wrong to de Marneffe who thinks that Spock can be well off or
badly off despite his lack of capacity for certain attitudes.6 This leads to what I’ll
call “Spock’s Horn”: we must either reject our intuitions about Spock or reject

concept of welfare does not apply Spock, this does not constitute a serious
problem for AH. In this paper, I’ll undertake both tasks. First I’ll adopt a narrow
view of attitudinal pleasure as de Marneffe does and argue that our intuitions

Attitudinal Hedonism, and de Marneffe chooses the latter.7 His argument might
be reconstructed as:

about Spock are mistaken. Then I’ll adopt a broad view of attitudinal pleasure
and argue for a definition of it endorsed by Chris Heathwood, specifically that
welfare the subjective satisfaction of desire.11 Although I find this broader view

(P1): If Attitudinal Hedonism (AH) is true, then Spock cannot be
well off or badly off.

of attitudinal pleasure the more plausible approach, either approach is a

5 Ibid.

8 Olsaretti (2007), 412n5.

6 Ibid. 199.

9 Feldman (2004), 50, 56.

7 Ibid. 200.

10 Olsaretti (2007), 411-412.
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positive prudential value.14 If Spock cannot be well off, then there are no goods

sufficient objection to de Marneffe.

which are of any prudential value to Spock.

The Narrow View of Pleasure: Spock Has No Capacity for Welfare
I’ll begin with the narrow view of attitudinal pleasure according to which

However, Taylor also identifies another often overlooked distinction, the
distinction between potential and actual prudential value. A good has potential

it is synonymous with (dis)enjoyment. Under this view of pleasure Attitudinal

prudential value if it is the sort of thing that will generally make someone’s life

Hedonism implies that it doesn't make sense to speak of Spock's welfare. But

go better, and this potential value is only realized once the good actually impacts

our intuition goes against this conclusion; it does make sense to speak of his

someone’s well-being.15 Returning to the death row example, the steak only has

welfare despite Spock's incapacity for (dis)enjoyment. Thus there are two

potential prudential value until the prisoner eats and enjoys it, thus realizing this

important tasks which must be accomplished to defend Attitudinal Hedonism.

potential value and converting it into actual value. This is only possible because

First, our intuitions about Spock must be explained. Second, a rejection of our

the prisoner enjoys steak and is able to eat it. If he were a vegan, or had no teeth,

intuitions must be justified.

the steak would merely have potential value for the prisoner, and this potential
Explaining Our Intuitions

would go unrealized. One way to make sense of our intuitions about Spock is to

To begin explaining why we intuitively believe there is a sense in which
Spock can be well off or not, we must make the distinction between well-

say that any and all goods have merely potential prudential value for him. We
intuitively feel that making rank on the Enterprise is good for Spock because we

being/welfare and prudential value. This subtle distinction is not often

recognize that it has potential prudential value. What we fail to acknowledge is

acknowledged. Whereas welfare and well-being are synonymous, prudential

that this potential cannot be realized by Spock. However, just as we might give

value is what contributes to welfare or well-being. As Tim E. Taylor puts it,

dentures to someone so they can eat steak, perhaps we could give some

some good X has positive prudential value for S if it increases S’s well-being.12
Taylor gives the example of a prisoner on death row who is eating his last meal
before execution.13 The meal itself has positive prudential value because it raises
his well-being, slightly. But overall, the prisoner’s well-being is bound to be

cybernetic implant to Spock which allows him to feel enjoyment.16
Another way we might explain our intuitions is to say that we project the
idea of welfare onto Spock because of our psychological altruism, our evolved
tendency to sometimes disregard our own self-interest for the sake of others.

low. He has endured horrible conditions on death row for a long time, and he is
about to die. As an analogy we might say that one’s welfare or well-being is like
one’s bank account and withdrawals and deposits are like goods with negative or

This evolutionary phenomenon is one way of explaining why group members
14 Ibid. 11.
15 Ibid.
16 Perhaps we are even obligated to do so in the same way we might be obligated to
provide amputees with prosthetics, or the blind with artificial eyes. It might be much
easier to swallow the fact that Spock has no welfare naturally, if we had the technology to
give him one artificially. This is an interesting line of thinking that I do not have the time
to explore here.

11 Heathwood (2006), 539-563.
12 Taylor (2013), 12.
13 Ibid. 10.
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tend to take care of each other, though culture and genetics contribute to this

ways. He might make the normative judgement that good examples of his

motivation as well.17 I argue that this evolutionary factor would cause us to care

species maintain their lives and rational capacities. He would be a bad example

about autonomous sentient beings such as Spock, even if those beings

of his species if he lacked these goods, so they’re good for him in the

technically fail to satisfy the conditions for well-being. We can see why it would

perfectionist sense rather than the prudential sense. Any given state of affairs

be advantageous for Captain Kirk and the rest of the crew to be inclined to

could be good for Spock morally, aesthetically, or perfectionistically, all of

attend to Spock's putative welfare and act accordingly. This would explain

which are normative considerations aside from well-being. Thus, the actual

Captain Kirk and the crew's inclination to be altruistic to Spock which I take to

implications of Spock not satisfying the conditions for well-being are not as

be an obvious way for the crew of a vessel to behave with respect to one

drastic as de Marneffe suggests, and Attitudinal Hedonism remains a plausible

another. Even if these intuitions technically are false beliefs, they serve the

theory of welfare.

useful purpose of promoting unity and cohesion on the Enterprise.

The Broad View of Pleasure: Spock's Welfare

Rejecting Our Intuitions

I now turn to the broad view of attitudinal pleasure which rejects P1 of

I’ve just identified a useful aspect of our intuitions about Spock, but I

Spock’s Horn. This view of attitudinal pleasure counters de Marneffe’s objection

want to argue for a rejection of those intuitions. Whatever their usefulness, we

by claiming that Spock does indeed have the relevant pro-attitudes necessary for

should not behave any differently towards Spock even if we reject those

welfare. This is the view Olsaretti holds19 but she argues this broad view is an

intuitions. We can admit that de Marneffe’s Spock does not have the capacity

inadequate account of attitudinal pleasure because of its lack of specificity and

for welfare while denying this is particularly problematic for Attitudinal

conceptual unity. If we’re going to use the broad view to counter de Marneffe,

Hedonism. Just because Spock lacks the capacity for well-being it does not

we’ll have to provide a specific definition of attitudinal pleasure. I propose the

follow that it would be permissible to treat him as if he had no moral worth. It

definition of attitudinal pleasure endorsed by Chris Heathwood.20 Attitudinal

would still be morally wrong to remove him unjustly from his post, to kill him

pleasure is the subjective satisfaction of desire. This definition encompasses all

or to deprive him of his rational capacities. Additionally, de Marneffe posits that

of the attitudinal pleasures that Feldman posits: enjoyment, being pleased, glad,

Spock is motivated by normative judgements.18 So as long as there are

delighted, satisfied, or content.21 It also clearly allows us to apply the concept of

normative considerations apart from prudential welfare, Spock would not view

welfare to Spock's condition since de Marneffe denies Spock a capacity for

himself as equally well off dead as alive. If you asked Spock whether he’d prefer

enjoyment but he admits that Spock has goals he wants to achieve.22 This

to maintain his rational capacities or not, he’d likely answer he’d rather maintain

19 Olsaretti (2007), 412n5.

them. Spock just has different motivations for answering these questions in these

20 Heathwood (2006), 539-563.

17 Sober and Wilson (1999), 296-305, 324-326.

21 Feldman (2004), 50, 56.

18 de Marneffe (2003), 198-199.

22 de Marneffe (2003), 198-199.
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definition of attitudinal pleasure will surely face objections, which I turn to now.

False Beliefs and Defective Desires
Heathwood is also convinced that one obtains attitudinal pleasure if they

Heathwood’s Good Life: Is it Really Hedonism?
It might seem as though I’ve now abandoned Attitudinal Hedonism in favor of

falsely believe a desire has been fulfilled.27 Feldman instead posits that taking

another theory, Desire-Satisfactionism. But the beauty of this definition, as Heathwood

pleasure in true beliefs is more valuable than taking pleasure in false ones.28 I

argues, is it reveals that Attitudinal Hedonism and Desire-Satisfactionism arethe very

side with Heathwood on this issue but even still we have good reason to prefer

same theory, described in different ways.23 In short, this is because the two theories do not

taking pleasure in true beliefs rather than false ones. It isn’t that truth modifies

disagree about the evaluation of lives. Heathwood argues thatit would be extremely

the value of pleasure but rather that taking pleasure in true beliefs increases the

difficult to imagine a case where an agent desires a state of affairs, believes this desire to

likelihood that the attitudinal pleasure will persist over time. Consider two men

be fulfilled, and yet fails to enjoy, be pleased, glad, delighted, satisfied, or content about
that state of affairs. Thus Attitudinal Hedonism and Desire Satisfactionism are the same
theories of welfare because they wholly agree about what the good life looks like.24

However, Heathwood also claims that attitudinal pleasure reduces to the
basic attitudes of desire and belief. One might claim the view is not purely
Hedonist since it identifies goods other than pleasure as having intrinsic value,
namely fulfilled desires.25 But this argument would be mistaken. Fulfilled
desires do not have value on their own, they require that some agent be aware of
the fulfillment. Heathwood gives an example of meeting a sick stranger on a

both of whom desire that their wives be faithful and take attitudinal pleasure in
believing this is the case. For the first man this belief is true, his wife is faithful.
But for the second it is false, his wife is secretly cheating on him.29 I maintain
that both men feel equal amounts of attitudinal pleasure but there is a chance the
second man will eventually learn the truth, at which point his pleasure will
cease.30
One more objection to consider is defective desire. Olsaretti argues that
attitudinal pleasure is distinct from desire because we sometimes remain
unpleased from fulfilling desires or find ourselves pleased by states of affairs we

train and desiring that the stranger recovers their health.26 Weeks after you’ve

did not previously desire.31 But Heathwood has a good response to this.32 First

parted ways, the stranger has indeed recovered their health, but it seems

he considers a case where he desires froot loops after remembering them from

incorrect to say your welfare has increased because of this. This demonstrates
that fulfilled desires on their own don’t have value, one must be aware they have

27 Ibid. 556.

been fulfilled, at which point attitudinal pleasure is obtained. So attitudinal

28 Feldman (2002), 614-616.

pleasure remains what is truly of value.

29 Feldman uses a similar example. It may be said that since Feldman and Heathwood
evaluate the lives of these men differently, they use different theories. This is true. But
Feldman is using an adjusted version of Attitudinal Hedonism. The more basic form of
Attitudinal Hedonism is still identical to Desire-Satisfactionism, as Heathwood claims.

23 Heathwood (2006), 556-560.

30 This analysis also side-steps the argument that Attitudinal Hedonism values truth for
its own sake. The belief that one’s wife is faithful only generates attitudinal pleasure if
one desires their wife to be faithful. A man in an open marriage on the other hand, does
not desire his wife to be faithful, and so receives no benefit from believing she is
regardless of if this belief is true or not.

24 Ibid.
25 Defining a purely Hedonist view as Olsaretti does (2007), 413.
26 Heathwood (2006), 543.
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his childhood but once he acquires the cereal, he finds he dislikes the overly

autonomous and sentient being. All this really means is that, for example, if you

sweet taste. Heathwood argues that once he bit into the froot loops, he lost the

have a delicious apple that you want to gift to someone on the Enterprise, it

desire for them. About being pleased at something we did not previously desire,

makes more sense for you to give it to Kirk (or another human) than Spock. But

he offers the example of his wife surprising him with a back massage; as soon as

Spock is likely to agree with this conclusion anyway, provided he has consumed

his wife begins the massage, he also forms a desire for it he did not have before.

enough calories for the day. Spock might be contented by the apple whereas

Essentially Heathwood is arguing that the cases Olsaretti seems to have in mind

Kirk might be delighted by it, so it is perfectly logical to give the apple to Kirk. I

ignore the element of time, an argument I find convincing which defends the

don’t see this as a problem for Attitudinal Hedonism.

claim that Attitudinal Hedonism and Desire-Satisfactionism are the same

Conclusion

theory.33

In this paper I’ve defended Attitudinal Hedonism by responding to de

What is Good for Spock?

Marneffe’s objection that according to AH, the concept of welfare cannot apply

Given this view of attitudinal pleasure as the subjective satisfaction of

to beings who cannot experience (dis)enjoyment. I argued that de Marneffe is

desire, we can see that Spock does indeed have a capacity for welfare according

either mistaken about the consequences of this incapacity for welfare, or else

to Attitudinal Hedonism. But it does appear that Spock is not capable of

mistaken that they lack the capacity in the first place. I’ve also argued that

achieving welfare to the same degree that humans do. Spock has desires he can

Attitudinal Hedonism and Desire-Satisfactionism are the same theory, due to the

satisfy but the states of attitudinal pleasure he can have are limited by his lack of

definition of attitudinal pleasure being the subjective fulfillment of desire. There

capacity for certain pro-attitudes. Spock appears to be capable of contentment

are of course more objections that might be raised against Attitudinal Hedonism

and satisfaction, but not enjoyment. We might say that Spock’s attitudinal

besides de Marneffe’s. But I’ve focused on his since they apply broadly to any

pleasures are not as intense as humans', which explains Spock’s cold and stoic

form of Attitudinal Hedonism whereas other objections often attack special

nature. But this is of little consequence, just as Spock’s incapacity for welfare

variants.34 I’m currently of the belief that Attitudinal Hedonism is the closest

under the narrow view turned out to be of little consequence. Spock’s lesser

thing we have to a true theory of welfare, and thus it is important to defend its

capacity for attitudinal pleasure surely does not affect his moral standing as an

plausibility.
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